The DREYFUS AFFAIR (French : l'affaire Dreyfus, pronounced ) was a political scandal that divided the Third French Republic from 1894 until its resolution in 1906. The affair is often seen as a modern and universal symbol of injustice, and it remains one of the most notable examples of a complex miscarriage of justice . The major role played by the press and public opinion proved influential in the lasting social conflict.
The scandal began in December 1894, with the treason conviction of
Evidence came to light in 1896—primarily through an investigation
Georges Picquart , head of
In 1899, Dreyfus was returned to France for another trial. The
intense political and judicial scandal that ensued divided French
society between those who supported Dreyfus (now called
"Dreyfusards"), such as
The affair from 1894 to 1906 divided France deeply and lastingly into two opposing camps: the pro-Army, mostly Catholic "anti-Dreyfusards" and the anticlerical, pro-republican Dreyfusards. It embittered French politics and encouraged radicalization.
* 1 Summary
* 2 Contexts
* 2.1 Political * 2.2 Military background * 2.3 Social
* 3 Origins of the case and the trial of 1894
* 3.1 The beginning: Acts of espionage * 3.2 Discovery of the Bordereau * 3.3 The search for the author of the bordereau * 3.4 Expertise in writing * 3.5 The arrest * 3.6 The enquiry and the first military court * 3.7 The enquiry * 3.8 The trial: "Closed Court or War!" * 3.9 Transmission of a secret dossier to the judges * 3.10 Conviction, degradation, and deportation
* 4 Truth on the march (1895–1897)
* 4.1 The Dreyfus family exposes the affair and takes action * 4.2 The discovery of the real culprit: Picquart "going to the enemy" * 4.3 The denunciation of Walsin-Esterházy and the progress of Dreyfusism * 4.4 Trial and acquittal of Major Esterházy
* 5 The case explodes in 1898
* 5.1 "J\'accuse ...!": The Dreyfus Affair becomes "The Affair" * 5.2 The trial of Zola * 5.3 Henry unmasked, the case is rekindled * 5.4 Crisis and reshaping the political landscape * 5.5 The appeal on the judgment of 1894
* 6 The trial in
* 6.1 Conduct of the trial * 6.2 New conviction * 6.3 Reactions
* 7 Rehabilitation, 1900–1906
* 7.1 Death of Zola
* 7.2 The semi-rehabilitation
* 7.2.1 Legal rehabilitation * 7.2.2 Subsequent career
* 8 Consequences of the Dreyfus Affair
* 8.1 Political consequences * 8.2 Social consequences * 8.3 International consequences
* 9 Other related events
* 9.1 Commission of sculpture * 9.2 Centennial commemoration
* 10 Historiography of the Dreyfus Affair * 11 See also * 12 Notes
* 13 Sources
* 13.1 Primary sources * 13.2 Reference bibliography * 13.3 Other general works * 13.4 In French * 13.5 Specialised works * 13.6 Anti-Dreyfusard works * 13.7 Articles and newspapers * 13.8 Testimonials
* 14 Other reference material
* 14.1 Literature
* 14.2 Filmography
* 14.2.1 News and stories * 14.2.2 Documentaries * 14.2.3 Cinema films * 14.2.4 TV films
* 14.3 Theatre * 14.4 Radio
* 15 References * 16 External links
At the end of 1894 a French army captain named
Certain of the injustice of the sentence, the family of the Captain, through his brother Mathieu , worked with the journalist Bernard Lazare to prove his innocence. Meanwhile Colonel Georges Picquart , head of counter-espionage, found evidence in March 1896 indicating that the real traitor was Major Ferdinand Walsin Esterházy . The General Staff , however, refused to reconsider its judgment and transferred Picquart to North Africa.
In July 1897 his family contacted the President of the Senate Auguste
Scheurer-Kestner to draw attention to the tenuousness of the evidence
against Dreyfus. Scheurer-Kestner reported three months later that he
was convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus and also persuaded Georges
Clemenceau , a former MP and then a newspaper reporter. In the same
Mathieu Dreyfus complained to the Ministry of War against
Walsin-Esterházy. While the circle of Dreyfusards widened, in January
1898 two nearly simultaneous events gave a national dimension to the
case: Esterházy was acquitted of treason charges (afterwards shaving
his moustache and fleeing France), and
Despite the intrigues of the army to quash the case, the first
judgment against Dreyfus was annulled by the Supreme Court after a
thorough investigation and a new court-martial was held at
The implications of this case were numerous and affected all aspects
of French public life. In politics, the affair established the triumph
of the Third Republic (and became a founding myth); in the renewal of
nationalism , in the military. In religion, it slowed the reform of
In 1894, the Third Republic was twenty-four years old. Although the
May 16th Crisis in 1877 had crippled the political influence of both
the Bourbon and
The opposition of the Radicals and Socialists resulted in a centrist
government where political choices were oriented towards economic
protectionism, a certain indifference to the social question, a
willingness to break international isolation, the Russian alliance,
and development of the Empire. These politics of the centre caused
ministerial instability, with certain Republicans from the government
sometimes aligning with the radicals and some Orléanists aligning
Following the failure of the radical government of Léon Bourgeois in 1896, the president appointed Jules Meline , who had been a supporter of protectionism under Jules Ferry . His government acknowledged the opposition of the left and some Republicans (including the Progressive Union) and always made certain of the support of the right. He sought to appease tensions in the religious (by slowing the anticlerical struggle), social (by passage of the law on the liability of work accidents), and economic (by maintenance of protectionism) sectors and he conducted a fairly conservative policy. These policies achieved stability, and it was under this stable government that the Dreyfus Affair actually broke out.
General Raoul Le Mouton de Boisdeffre , architect of the military alliance with Russia
The Dreyfus Affair occurred within the context of the annexation of
The military required considerable resources to prepare for the next
conflict, and it was in this spirit that the
Over the previous ten years the army had experienced a significant
shift in its twofold aim to democratize and modernize. The graduates
The operation of military counterintelligence, alias the "Statistics
Section" (SR), should be noted. Spying as a tool for secret war was a
novelty as an organised activity in the late 19th century. The
Statistics Section was created in 1871 but consisted of only a handful
of officers and civilians. Its head in 1894 was Lieutenant-Colonel
The German military attaché in
Since early 1894, the Statistics Section had investigated traffic in master plans for Nice and the Meuse conducted by an officer whom the Germans and Italians nicknamed Dubois. This is what led to the origins of the Dreyfus Affair.
The social context was marked by the rise of nationalism and of antisemitism .
The growth of antisemitism, virulent since the publication of Jewish France by Édouard Drumont in 1886 (150,000 copies in the first year), went hand in hand with the rise of clericalism . Tensions were high in all strata of society, fueled by an influential press, who were virtually free to write and disseminate any information even if offensive or defamatory. Legal risks were limited if the target was a private person.
The popularity of the duel using sword or small pistol, sometimes
causing death, bore witness to the tensions of the period. When a
series of press articles in
La Libre Parole
Hatred of Jews was now public and violent, driven by a firebrand
(Drumont) who demonized the Jewish presence in France. Jews in
metropolitan France in 1895 numbered about 80,000 (40,000 in Paris
alone), who were highly integrated into society; an additional 45,000
Jews lived in
ORIGINS OF THE CASE AND THE TRIAL OF 1894
Main article: Investigation and the arrest of
THE BEGINNING: ACTS OF ESPIONAGE
Photograph of the bordereau dated 13 October 1894. The original disappeared in 1940
The origin of the Dreyfus Affair, although fully clarified since the 1960s, has aroused much controversy for nearly a century. The intentions remain unclear. Many of the most eminent historians express different hypotheses about the affair but all arrive at the same conclusion: Dreyfus was innocent of any crime or offence.
DISCOVERY OF THE BORDEREAU
The staff of the Military Intelligence Service (SR) worked constantly so that in September 1894 the French housekeeper at the German embassy, brought a letter to French counter-espionage, known thereafter as "the bordereau". This letter, partially torn into six large pieces, written on tissue paper, unsigned and undated, was addressed to the German military attaché stationed at the German Embassy, Max von Schwartzkoppen . It stated that confidential French military documents of relative importance were about to be sent to a foreign power.
THE SEARCH FOR THE AUTHOR OF THE BORDEREAU
General Auguste Mercier, Minister of War in 1894
This catch seemed of sufficient importance for the head of the
"Statistical Section", the Mulhousian
The ideal culprit was identified: Captain
In fact, the legend of Dreyfus being of a cold and musty character, even haughty, as well as his "curiosity", worked strongly against him. These traits of character, some false, others natural, made the charges plausible by turning the most ordinary acts of everyday life in the ministry into proof of espionage. From the beginning a biased and one-sided multiplication of errors led the State to a false position. This was present throughout the affair, where irrationality prevailed over the positivism in vogue in that period:
From this first hour the phenomenon occurred that will dominate the whole affair. It is no longer controlled by facts and circumstances carefully examined which will constitute a belief; it is the irresistible cavalier conviction which distorts the facts and beliefs. — Joseph Reinach
EXPERTISE IN WRITING
Major du Paty de Clam , head of investigation, arrested Captain Dreyfus
To condemn Dreyfus, the writing on the bordereau had to be compared to that of the Captain. There was nobody competent to analyse the writing on the General Staff. Then Major du Paty de Clam entered the scene: an eccentric man who prided himself on being an expert in Graphology . On being shown some letters by Dreyfus and the bordereau on 5 October, du Paty concluded immediately who wrote the two writings. After a day of additional work he provided a report that, despite some differences, the similarities were sufficient to warrant an investigation. Dreyfus was therefore "the probable author" of the bordereau in the eyes of the General Staff. Alphonse Bertillon was not a handwriting expert, but he invented the theory of "autoforgery"
General Mercier believed he had the guilty party, but he exaggerated the value of the affair, which took on the status of an affair of state during the week preceding the arrest of Dreyfus. The Minister did consult and inform all the authorities of the State, yet despite prudent counsel and courageous objections expressed by Gabriel Hanotaux in the Council of Ministers he decided to pursue it. Du Paty de Clam was appointed Judicial Police Officer to lead an official investigation.
Meanwhile several parallel sources of information were opening up,
some on the personality of Dreyfus, others to ensure the truth of the
identity of the author of the bordereau. The expert Gobert was not
convinced and found many differences. He even wrote that "the nature
of the writing on the bordereau excludes disguised handwriting".
Disappointed, Mercier then called in
On 13 October 1894, without any tangible evidence and with an empty file, General Mercier summoned Captain Dreyfus for a general inspection in "bourgeois clothing", i.e. in civilian clothes. The purpose of the General Staff was to obtain the perfect proof under French law: a confession . That confession was to be obtained by surprise – by dictating a letter based on the bordereau to reveal his guilt.
In the morning of 15 October 1894 Captain Dreyfus underwent this
ordeal but admitted nothing. Du Paty even tried to suggest suicide by
placing a revolver in front of Dreyfus, but he refused to take his
life, saying he "wanted to live to establish his innocence". The hopes
of the military were crushed. Nevertheless Du Paty de Clam still
arrested the captain, accused him of conspiring with the enemy, and
told him that he would be brought before a court-martial. Dreyfus was
imprisoned at the
Cherche-Midi prison in
THE ENQUIRY AND THE FIRST MILITARY COURT
Mrs. Dreyfus was informed of the arrest the same day by a police raid to search their apartment. She was terrorized by Du Paty, who ordered her to keep the arrest of her husband secret and even said, "One word, one single word and it will be a European war!". Totally illegally, Dreyfus was placed in solitary confinement in prison, where Du Paty interrogated him day and night in order to obtain a confession, which failed. The captain was morally supported by the first Dreyfusard, Major Forzinetti, commandant of the military prisons of Paris.
On 29 October 1894 the affair was revealed in an article in La Libre Parole , the antisemitic newspaper owned by Édouard Drumont . This marked the beginning of a very brutal press campaign until the trial. This event put the affair in the field of antisemitism where it remained until its conclusion.
On 1 November 1894 Alfred's brother, Mathieu Dreyfus, became aware of the arrest after being called urgently to Paris. He became the architect of the arduous fight for the liberation of his brother. Without hesitation, he began looking for a lawyer, and retained the distinguished criminal lawyer Edgar Demange .
On 3 November 1894 General Saussier the Military governor of Paris reluctantly gave the order for an enquiry. He had the power to stop the process but did not, perhaps because of an exaggerated confidence in military justice. Major Besson d'Ormescheville, the recorder for the Military Court, wrote an indictment in which "moral elements" of the charge (which gossiped about the habits of Dreyfus and his alleged attendance at "gambling circles", his knowledge of German, and his "remarkable memory") were developed more extensively than the "material elements", which are rarely seen in the charge:
"This is a proof of guilt because Dreyfus made everything disappear".
The complete lack of neutrality of the indictment led to Émile Zola calling it a "monument of bias".
On 4 December 1894 Dreyfus was referred to the first Military Court with the empty file. The secrecy was lifted and M. Demange could access the file for the first time. After reading it the lawyer had absolute confidence, as he saw the emptiness of the prosecution’s case. The prosecution rested completely on the writing on a single piece of paper, the bordereau, on which experts disagreed, and on vague indirect testimonies.
THE TRIAL: "CLOSED COURT OR WAR!"
Main article: Trial and conviction of
During the two months before the trial, the press went wild. La Libre
Parole, L'Autorite, Le Journal, and
The jousting of the columnists took place within a broader debate
about the issue of a closed court. For Ranc and Cassagnac, who
represented the majority of the press, the closed court was a low
manoeuvre to enable the acquittal of Dreyfus, "because the minister is
a coward". The proof was "that he grovels before the Prussians" by
agreeing to publish the denials of the German ambassador in Paris. In
other newspapers, such as L’Éclair on 13 December 1894: "the closed
court is necessary to avoid a casus belli ; while for Judet in Le
Petit Journal of 18 December: "the closed court is our impregnable
refuge against Germany"; or in
The trial opened on 19 December 1894 at one o'clock and a closed court was immediately pronounced. This closed court was not legally consistent since Major Picquart and Prefect Louis Lépine were present at certain proceedings in violation of the law. The closed court allowed the military to still not disclose the emptiness of their evidence to the public and to stifle debate. As expected, the emptiness of their case appeared clearly during the hearings. Detailed discussions on the bordereau showed that Captain Dreyfus could not be the author. At the same time the accused himself protested his innocence and defended himself point by point with energy and logic. Moreover, his statements were supported by a dozen defence witnesses. Finally, the absence of motive for the crime was a serious thorn in the prosecution case. Dreyfus was indeed a very patriotic officer highly rated by his superiors, very rich and with no tangible reason to betray France. The fact of Dreyfus's Jewishness was only used by the right-wing press and was not presented in court.
TRANSMISSION OF A SECRET DOSSIER TO THE JUDGES
Max von Schwartzkoppen always claimed never to have known Dreyfus
Military witnesses at the trial alerted high command about the risk of acquittal. For this eventuality the Statistics Section had prepared a file containing, in principle, four "absolute" proofs of the guilt of Captain Dreyfus accompanied by an explanatory note. The contents of this secret file remained uncertain until 2013, when they were released by the French Ministry of Defence. Recent research indicates the existence of numbering which suggests the presence of a dozen documents. Among these letters were some of an erotic homosexual nature (the Davignon letter among others) raising the question of the tainted methods of the Statistics Section and the objective of their choice of documents.
The secret file was illegally submitted at the beginning of the
deliberations by the President of the Military Court, Colonel Émilien
Maurel, by order of the Minister of War, General Mercier. Later at
It was a letter from the German military attache, Max von Schwarzkoppen, to the Italian military attaché, Alessandro Panizzardi, intercepted by the SR. The letter was supposed to accuse Dreyfus definitively, since according to his accusers it was signed with the initial of his name. In reality, the Statistics Section knew that the letter could not be attributed to Dreyfus and if it was, it was with criminal intent. Colonel Maurel confirmed in the second Dreyfus trial that the secret documents were not used to win the support of the judges of the Military Court. He contradicted himself, however, by saying that he read only one document, "which was enough".
CONVICTION, DEGRADATION, AND DEPORTATION
Alfred Dreyfus' degradation, 5 January 1895. Picture by Henri
Meyer on the cover of Le Petit Journal (13 January 1895), captioned
On 22 December 1894, after several hours of deliberation, the verdict
was reached. Seven judges unanimously convicted
For the authorities, the press and the public, doubts had been
dispelled by the trial and his guilt was certain. Right and left
regretted the abolition of the death penalty for such a crime.
On 5 January 1895, the ceremony of degradation took place in the
Morlan Court of the Military School in Paris. While the drums rolled,
Dreyfus was accompanied by four artillery officers, who brought him
before an officer of the state who read the judgment. A Republican
Guard adjutant tore off his badges, thin strips of gold, his stripes,
cuffs and sleeves of his jacket. Witnesses report the dignity of
Dreyfus, who continued to maintain his innocence while raising his
arms: "Innocent, Innocent! Vive la France! Long live the Army". The
Adjutant broke his sword on his knee and then the condemned Dreyfus
marched at a slow pace in front of his former companions. An event
known as "the legend of the confession" took place before the
degradation. In the van that brought him to the military school,
Dreyfus is said to have confided his treachery to Captain
Lebrun-Renault. It appears that in reality, the captain of the
Republican Guard had boasted that Dreyfus had made no admission. Due
to the affair's being related to national security, the prisoner was
then held in solitary confinement in a cell awaiting transfer. On 17
January 1895, he was transferred to the prison on
Île de Ré
At the last minute, at the initiative of General Mercier, a law was
passed on 9 February 1895, restoring the
Îles du Salut in French
Guiana , as a place of fortified deportation so that Dreyfus was not
sent to Ducos,
On 12 March 1895, after a difficult voyage of fifteen days, the ship anchored off the Îles du Salut. Dreyfus stayed one month in prison on Île Royale and was transferred to Devil\'s Island on 14 April 1895. Apart from his guards, he was the only inhabitant of the island and he stayed in a stone hut 4 by 4 metres (13 ft × 13 ft). Haunted by the risk of escape, the commandant of the prison sentenced him to a hellish life, even though living conditions were already very painful. Dreyfus became sick and shaken by fevers that got worse every year.
Dreyfus was allowed to write on paper numbered and signed. He underwent censorship by the commandant even when he received mail from his wife Lucie, whereby they encouraged each other. On 6 September 1896, the conditions of life for Dreyfus worsened again; he was chained double looped, forcing him to stay in bed motionless with his ankles shackled. This measure was the result of false information of his escape revealed by a British newspaper. For two long months, Dreyfus was plunged into deep despair, convinced that his life would end on this remote island.
TRUTH ON THE MARCH (1895–1897)
THE DREYFUS FAMILY EXPOSES THE AFFAIR AND TAKES ACTION
Mathieu Dreyfus , the elder brother of Alfred, was convinced of his innocence. He was the chief architect of the rehabilitation of his brother and spent his time, energy and fortune to gather an increasingly powerful movement for a retrial in December 1894, despite the difficulties of the task:
After the degradation emptiness was around us. It seemed to us that we were no longer human beings like others, we were cut off from the world of the living…
Mathieu tried all paths, even the most fantastic. Thanks to Dr.
Gibert, a friend of President
Félix Faure , he met at
Little by little, despite threats of arrest for complicity,
machinations and entrapment by the military, he managed to convince
various moderates. Thus the anarchist journalist Bernard Lazare
looked into the proceedings. In 1896 Lazare published the first
Dreyfusard booklet in
The campaign for the review, relayed little by little into the leftist anti-military press, triggered a return of a violent yet vague antisemitism. France was overwhelmingly anti-Dreyfusard; Major Henry from the Statistics Section in turn was aware of the thinness of the prosecution case. At the request of his superiors, General Boisdeffre , Chief of the General Staff and Major-General Gonse , he was charged with the task of growing the file to prevent any attempt at a review. Unable to find any evidence, he decided to build some after the fact.
THE DISCOVERY OF THE REAL CULPRIT: PICQUART "GOING TO THE ENEMY"
Lieutenant Colonel Georges Picquart was assigned to be head of the SR in July 1895 following the illness of Colonel Sandherr. In March 1896 Picquart, who had followed the Dreyfus Affair from the outset, now required to receive the documents stolen from the German Embassy directly without any intermediary. He discovered a document called the "petit bleu": a telegram that was never sent, written by von Schwarzkoppen and intercepted at the German embassy at the beginning of March 1896. It was addressed to a French officer, Major Walsin-Esterházy , 27 rue de la Bienfaisance – Paris. In another letter in black pencil, von Schwarzkoppen revealed the same clandestine relationship with Esterházy.
On seeing letters from Esterházy, Picquart realized with amazement that his writing was exactly the same as that on the "bordereau", which had been used to incriminate Dreyfus. He procured the "secret file" given to the judges in 1894 and was astonished by the lack of evidence against Dreyfus, and became convinced of his innocence. Very moved by his discovery, Picquart diligently conducted an enquiry in secret without the consent of his superiors. The enquiry demonstrated that Esterházy had knowledge of the elements described by the "bordereau" and that he was in contact with the German embassy. It was established that the officer sold the Germans many secret documents, whose value was quite low.
Ferdinand Walsin Esterházy was a former member of French counterespionage where he had served after the war of 1870. He had worked in the same office as Major Henry from 1877 to 1880. A man with a personality disorder, a sulphurous reputation and crippled by debt, Picquart considered him a traitor driven by monetary reasons to betray his country. Picquart communicated the results of his investigation to the General Staff, which opposed him under "the authority of the principle of already judged". After this, everything was done to oust him from his position, with the help of his own deputy, Major Henry. It was primarily the upper echelons of the Army that did not want to admit that Dreyfus's conviction could be a grave miscarriage of justice. For Mercier, then Zurlinden and the General Staff, what was done was done and never returned. They found it convenient to separate the Dreyfus and Esterházy affairs.
THE DENUNCIATION OF WALSIN-ESTERHáZY AND THE PROGRESS OF DREYFUSISM
The nationalist press launched a violent campaign against the
burgeoning Dreyfusards. In counter-attack, the General Staff
discovered and revealed the information hitherto ignored in the
"secret file". Doubt began to surface, and figures in the artistic
and political spheres asked questions. Picquart tried to convince his
seniors to react in favour of Dreyfus, but the General Staff seemed
deaf. An investigation was started against him, he was monitored when
he was in the east, then transferred to
At this moment Major Henry chose to take action. On 1 November 1896, he created a false document, subsequently called the "faux Henry" , keeping the header and signature of an ordinary letter from Panizzardi, and wrote the central text himself:
I read that a deputy will call on Dreyfus. If you ask further explanations from Rome, I would say that I never had relations with the Jew. That is understood. If asked, speak like that, because that person should never know what happened with him.
This was a rather crude forgery. Generals Gonse and Boisdeffre, however, without asking questions, brought the letter to their minister, General Billot . The doubts of the General Staff regarding the innocence of Dreyfus flew out the window. With this discovery the General Staff decided to protect Esterházy and persecute Colonel Picquart, "who did not understand anything". Picquart, who knew nothing of the "faux Henry", quickly felt isolated from his fellow soldiers. Major Henry accused Picquart of embezzlement and sent him a letter full of innuendo. He protested in writing and returned to Paris.
Picquart confided in his friend, lawyer Louis Leblois, who promised secrecy. But Leblois spoke to the vice president of the Senate, the Alsatian Auguste Scheurer-Kestner , who was in turn infected by doubts. Without citing Picquart, the senator revealed the affair to the highest people in the country. The General Staff, however, still suspected Picquart of causing leaks. This was the beginning of the Picquart affair, a new conspiracy by the General Staff against an officer.
Major Henry, although deputy to Picquart, was jealous and fostered his own malicious operation to compromise his superior. He engaged in various malpractices (making a letter and designating it as an instrument of a "Jewish syndicate", wanting to help Dreyfus to escape, rigging the "petit bleu" to create a belief that Picquart erased the name of the real recipient, drafting a letter naming Dreyfus in full).
Parallel to the investigations of Picquart, the defenders of Dreyfus
were informed in November 1897 that the identity of the writer of the
"bordereau" was Esterházy.
Mathieu Dreyfus had a reproduction of the
bordereau published by
Le Figaro . A banker, Castro, formally
identified the writing as that of Major Walsin-Esterházy, who was his
debtor, and told Mathieu. On 11 November 1897, the two paths of
investigation met during a meeting between Scheurer-Kestner and
Mathieu Dreyfus. The latter finally received confirmation that
Esterházy was the author of the note. Based on this, on 15 November
Mathieu Dreyfus made a complaint to the minister of war against
Walsin-Esterházy. The controversy was now public and the army had no
choice but to open an investigation. At the end of 1897, Picquart
The Dreyfusard movement, led by Bernard Lazare,
Mathieu Dreyfus ,
Joseph Reinach and
Auguste Scheurer-Kestner gained momentum. Émile
Zola , informed in mid-November 1897 by Scheurer-Kestner with
documents, was convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus and undertook to
engage himself officially. On 25 November 1897 the novelist published
Mr. Scheurer-Kestner in
Le Figaro , which was the first article in a
series of three. Faced with threats of massive cancellations from its
readers, the paper's editor stopped supporting Zola. Gradually, from
late-November through early-December 1897, a number of prominent
people got involved in the fight for retrial. These included the
Octave Mirbeau (his first article was published three days
after Zola) and
The Dreyfus Affair occupied more and more discussions, something the political world did not always recognize. Jules Méline declared in the opening session of the National Assembly on 7 December 1897, "There is no Dreyfus affair. There is not now and there can be no Dreyfus affair."
TRIAL AND ACQUITTAL OF MAJOR ESTERHáZY
Georges-Gabriel de Pellieux
Although protected by the General Staff and therefore by the
government, Esterházy was obliged to admit authorship of the
Francophobe letters published by Le Figaro. This convinced the Office
of the General Staff to find a way to stop the questions, doubts, and
the beginnings of demands for justice. The idea was to require
Esterházy to demand a trial and be acquitted, to stop the noise and
allow a return to order. Thus, to finally exonerate him, according to
the old rule Res judicata pro veritate habetur, Esterházy was set to
appear before a military court on 10 January 1898. A "delayed" closed
court trial was pronounced. Esterházy was notified of the matter on
the following day, along with guidance on the defensive line to take.
The trial was not normal: the civil trial Mathieu and Lucy Dreyfus
requested was denied, and the three handwriting experts decided the
writing in the bordereau was not Esterházy's. The accused was
applauded and the witnesses booed and jeered. Pellieux intervened to
defend the General Staff without legal substance. The real accused
was Lt. Col. Picquart, who was dishonoured by all the military
protagonists of the affair. Esterházy was acquitted unanimously the
next day after just three minutes of deliberation. With all the
cheering, it was difficult for Esterházy to make his way toward the
exit, where some 1,500 people were waiting.
By error an innocent person was convicted, but on order the guilty party was acquitted. For many moderate Republicans it was an intolerable infringement of the fundamental values they defended. The acquittal of Esterházy therefore brought about a change of strategy for the Dreyfusards. Liberalism-friendly Scheurer-Kestner and Reinach , took more combative and rebellious action. In response to the acquittal, large and violent riots by anti-Dreyfusards and anti-Semites broke out across France, respecting neither property nor people.
Flush with victory, the General Staff arrested Lt. Col. Picquart on charges of violation of professional secrecy following the disclosure of his investigation through his lawyer, who revealed it to Senator Scheurer-Kestner. The colonel, although placed under arrest at Fort Mont-Valérien , did not give up and involved himself further in the affair. When Mathieu thanked him, he replied curtly that he was "doing his duty". The army declared Major Esterházy unfit for service. To avoid personal risk he went into exile in England, where he lived comfortably and ended his days in the 1920s. Esterházy benefited from special treatment by the upper echelons of the army, which was inexplicable except for the General Staff's desire to stifle any inclination to challenge the verdict of the court martial that convicted Captain Dreyfus in 1894.
THE CASE EXPLODES IN 1898
"J\'ACCUSE ...!": THE DREYFUS AFFAIR BECOMES "THE AFFAIR"
Main article: J\'accuse Page one of L'Aurore, "
by Émile Zola, 13 January 1898
On 13 January 1898 Zola touched off a new dimension in the Dreyfus Affair, which became known simply as, The Affair. The first great Dreyfusard intellectual , Zola was at the height of his glory: the twenty volumes of the Rougon-Macquart were being distributed in dozens of countries. He was a leader in the literary world and was fully conscious of it. To General Pellieux, he said at his trial, "I ask General Pellieux if there are not many ways to serve France? It can be served by the sword or by the pen. General Pellieux has probably won great victories! I have won mine, too. By my work the French language has been brought into the world. I have my victories! I bequeath to posterity the name of General Pellieux and that of Émile Zola: history will choose!
Outraged by the acquittal of Esterházy, Zola decided to strike a blow. He published a 4,500-word article on the front page of L'Aurore in the form of an open letter to President Félix Faure (Clemenceau thought up the headline " J'Accuse ...!"). With a typical circulation of 30,000, the newspaper distributed nearly 300,000 copies that day. This article had the effect of an explosion. The article was a direct attack, explicit and clear, and named names. It denounced all those who had conspired against Dreyfus, including the minister of war and the General Staff. The article contained numerous errors, exaggerating or minimizing the roles of one or another of the figures involved but Zola never claimed to be a historian.
" J'Accuse ...!" provided for the first time a compilation of all existing data on the affair in one place. Zola's goal was to make himself a target, to force the authorities to prosecute him. His trial forced a new public review of both the Dreyfus and Esterházy affairs. Here he went against the strategy of Scheurer-Kestner and Lazare, who advocated patience and reflection. Thanks to the national and international success of Zola's brilliant coup, a trial became inevitable. From that critical moment the case followed two parallel paths. On one hand, the state used its apparatus to impose a limitation on the trial, restricting it to one of simple libel so as to separate the Dreyfus and Esterházy cases, which had already been adjudicated. On the other hand, conflicting camps of opinion tried to influence judges and the government—one side pushed to obtain a review and the other to convict Zola. But Zola achieved his aim: the opening of a public debate at the Assize Court .
On 15 January 1898
On 20 January 1898, after an anti-Zola speech by rightist politician
Albert de Mun
THE TRIAL OF ZOLA
Henry de Groux, Zola faces the mob, oil on canvas, 1898
General Billot , Minister of War, filed a complaint against Zola and
Alexandre Perrenx, the manager of L'Aurore, to be heard at the Assises
of the Seine from 7 to 23 February 1898. Defamation of a public
authority was liable to trial in the Cour d\'Assises , while insults
to private figures—such as journalists and intellectuals—uttered
by the nationalist and antisemitic press were limited to the civil
adversarial system. (The taxpayer is at risk in the first case, while
only the plaintiff is at risk in the second.) The minister referred to
only three passages of Zola's article, eighteen lines out of
hundreds. He accused Zola of having written that the court martial had
committed "unlawful acts by order". The trial opened in an
atmosphere of extreme violence—Zola had been the object of "the most
shameful attacks" as well as important support and congratulations.
Anthropometric photography of
Fernand Labori , Zola's lawyer intended to call about 200 witnesses. The details of the Dreyfus Affair, unknown to most of the public, were published in the press. Several papers published shorthand notes verbatim of the debates every day to build support in the population. These notes were, for the Dreyfusards, an essential tool for later debates. The nationalists, behind Henri Rochefort , however, were more visible and organized riots, which forced the prefect of police to intervene to protect Zola whenever he left the facility after every hearing.
This trial was also the scene of a real legal battle in which the rights of the defence were constantly violated. Many observers were aware of the collusion between France's political and military worlds. Evidently the court received instructions not to raise the subject of former judicial errors. President Delegorgue, on the pretext of the long duration of the hearings, juggled the law incessantly to ensure that the trial dealt only with the alleged defamation by Zola. Delegorgue's phrase "the question will not be put" was repeated dozens of times and became famous. Example of an exchange between Fernand Labori, lawyer for the defence and the President of the Court, Delegorgue
* LABORI: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, to intervene, but I would be interested to hear Messrs Couard, Belhomme and Varinard. * PRESIDENT: No, no I have said ... * LABORI: But I have a question to put * PRESIDENT : You will not put it. * LABORI: I insist Mr. President. * PRESIDENT: I have told you, you may not put it. * LABORI: Oh! Mr. President! It is of interest... * PRESIDENT: It is pointless to shout so loudly. * LABORI: I shout because I need to be heard. * PRESIDENT : The question will not be put. * LABORI: I understand you have said that; but I said that I want to put it. * PRESIDENT: Well! I say no, and it is a case already heard! The president has a right to dismiss this debate. All this prolongs the debate uselessly. It is my right to do this. * LABORI: You do not understand the question. You do not know what the question is. * PRESIDENT: I know perfectly well what you are going to ask. * LABORI: Well, I have come to the conclusion that the court should be stopped at this point. * PRESIDENT: Come to all the conclusions that you want. * LABORI: If you believe you can cut short the debate you deceive yourself. * PRESIDENT: Well, we will decide on the findings during the recess * (To the court bailiff): Another witness. * (Mr. Auguste Molinier presents himself at the bar and takes the oath.) * PRESIDENT: Has the witness been summoned in the normal way? * COURT CLERK: Yes, Mr. President. * PRESIDENT: What is the question, Master Labori? * LABORI: I beg your pardon. I have written a finding, and I consider it absolutely essential that the testimony of Mr. Paul Meyer and the events described therein finish being discussed before the testimony of another witness. I do not need more than two minutes. I ask respectfully that you allow me to quickly question the witness. * PRESIDENT: But this witness has been sworn; It is absolutely necessary that he be questioned now. * CLEMENCEAU: It is a question of two minutes. * PRESIDENT: Ask your question now! It is useless to waste our time. * LABORI: I think that hearing Messrs Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard is essential to the truth and I maintain that the refusal of this order is recorded before the witness testifies: I consider it essential from the standpoint of the defence. * (The President turns the pages in the Code of Criminal practice.) * PRESIDENT TO MR. MOLINIER: Sir, would you please leave. * (To the court bailiff): Would you remove this witness please. * (Mr. Labori drew his conclusions)
Zola was sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of 3,000 francs, which was the maximum penalty. This harshness was due to the atmosphere of violence surrounding the trial. "The excitement of the audience and the exasperation of the crowd in front of the courthouse were so violent that one could fear the worst excesses if the jury acquitted Mr. Zola". However, the Zola trial was rather a victory for the Dreyfusards. Indeed, the affair and its contradictions had been widely discussed throughout the trial, especially by the military. In addition, the violent attacks against Zola and the injustice of the conviction of Dreyfus reinforced the commitment of the Dreyfusards. Stéphane Mallarmé declared, " imbued by the admirable actions " and Jules Renard wrote in his diary: "From tonight I hold on to the Republic that inspires respect in me, a tenderness in me that I do not know. I declare that the word Justice is the most beautiful in the language of men and must cry if men no longer understand it". Senator Ludovic Trarieux and Catholic jurist Paul Viollet founded the League for the Defence of Human Rights . Even more than the Dreyfus Affair the Zola affair resulted in a regrouping of intellectual forces into two opposing camps.
On 2 April 1898 an application to the Supreme Court received a
favourable response. This was the court's first intervention in the
affair. The military court made the complaint, rather than the
minister. Prosecutor-General Manau supported a review of the Dreyfus
trial and strongly opposed the anti-Semites. The judges of the
military court, whom Zola had challenged, sued him for libel. The case
was brought before the Assizes of Seine-et-Oise in Versailles where
the public was considered more favourable to the army and more
nationalistic. On 23 May 1898, at the first hearing, Mr. Labori
appealed to the Supreme Court regarding the change of jurisdiction,
which adjourned the trial and postponed the hearing to 18 July 1898.
Labori advised Zola to leave France for
HENRY UNMASKED, THE CASE IS REKINDLED
Photograph of the "faux Henry". The header ("my dear friend") and signature ("Alexandrine") are from Panizzardi. The rest is from the hand of Henry.
The acquittal of Esterházy, the convictions of
Godefroy Cavaignac , the new minister of war and a fierce supporter of anti-revisionism, definitely wanted to prove the guilt of Dreyfus and from there "wring the neck" of Esterházy, whom he considered "a pathological liar and blackmailer". He was absolutely convinced of Dreyfus's guilt, a conviction reinforced by the legend of the confession (after meeting the main witness, Captain Lebrun-Renault). Cavaignac had the honesty of a doctrinaire intransigent, but absolutely did not know the depths of The Affair—the General Staff had kept him in the dark. He had been surprised to learn that all the documents on which the prosecution was based had not been expertly appraised and that Boisdeffre had "absolute confidence" in Henry. Cavaignac decided to investigate—in his office, with his assistants—and retrieved the secret file, which now contained 365 items.
On 4 April the newspaper Le Siècle published Lettre d'un Diplomate, the first of four documents, that were of critical importance in exposing Esterházy's guilt, and enabled the Dreyfusard cause to regain the initiative it had lost with Zola's conviction. The secret information had been provided by Zola, who had received it from Oscar Wilde : Wilde had gained it from best friend Carlos Blacker, who was an intimate friend of Alexandro Panizzardi. Portrait of Godefroy Cavaignac , Minister of War
On 7 July 1898 during a questioning in the House, Cavaignac reported
three items "overwhelming among a thousand", two of which had no
connection with the case. The other was the "faux Henry". Cavaignac's
speech was effective: the MPs gave him an ovation and voted to display
copies of the three documents in the 36,000 communes of France. The
anti-Dreyfusards had triumphed, but Cavaignac implicitly recognized
that the Dreyfus's defence had not had access to all the evidence. The
application for annulment made by Lucie Dreyfus became admissible. The
next day, Colonel Picquart declared in
On the evening of 13 August 1898, Captain Cuignet, who was attached to the cabinet of Cavaignac, was working by the light of a lamp and observed that the colour of the lines on the "faux Henry" paper header and footer did not correspond with the central part of the document. Cavaignac was still trying to find logical reasons for the guilt and conviction of Dreyfus but was not silent on this discovery. A board of inquiry was formed to investigate Esterházy, before which he panicked and confessed his secret reports to Major du Paty de Clam. Collusion between the General Staff and the traitor was revealed. On 30 August 1898 Cavaignac resigned himself to demanding explanations from Colonel Henry in the presence of Boisdeffre and Gonse. After an hour of questioning by the minister himself Henry broke down and made a full confession. He was placed under arrest at the Mont-Valérien fortress, where he killed himself the next day by cutting his own throat with a razor. The request for review filed by Lucie Dreyfus could not be rejected. Yet Cavaignac said "less than ever!", but the president of the council, Henri Brisson , forced him to resign. Despite his apparently entirely involuntary role in the revision of the 1894 trial, Brisson remained convinced that Dreyfus was guilty and made a statement disparaging and offensive to Dreyfus at the Rennes trial. Drawing by Caran d'Ache in Le Figaro on 14 February 1898.
The anti-revisionists did not consider themselves beaten. On 6
France was really divided into two, but no more generalization is possible: the Jewish community was little involved, intellectuals were not all Dreyfusards, the Protestants were divided, and Marxists refused to support Dreyfus. The split transcended religion and social background, as shown in the famous cartoon by Caran d\'Ache "A family dinner".
CRISIS AND RESHAPING THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
Henry was dead, Boisdeffre had resigned, Gonse had no more authority, and du Paty had been severely compromised by Esterházy: for the conspirators it was a débâcle. The government was now caught between two fires: the nationalist pressure on the street and the higher command. Cavaignac, having resigned for continuing to spread his anti-Dreyfusard vision of the Affair, arose as an anti-revisionist leader. General Zurlinden who succeeded him and was influenced by the General Staff, delivered a negative opinion at the review on 10 September 1898 comforting the extremist press by saying that, "a review means war". The obstinacy of the Government, who voted to revert to the Supreme Court on 26 September 1898, led to the resignation of Zurlinden who was soon replaced by General Chanoine . When Chanoine was questioned in the House he handed in his resignation; trust was denied to Brisson and he was also forced to resign. Ministerial instability caused some governmental instability.
On 1 November 1898 the Progressive Charles Dupuy was appointed in place of Brisson. In 1894 he had covered the actions of General Mercier at the beginning of the Dreyfus Affair, and four years later he announced that he would follow the judgment of the Supreme Court, thus blocking the road for those who wanted to stifle the review and divest the Court. On 5 December 1898 in the shadow of a debate in the House on the transmission of the "secret file" to the Supreme Court the tension rose another notch. Insults, invective, and other nationalistic violence gave way to threats of an uprising. Paul Déroulède declared: "If there has to be a civil war so be it."
A new crisis arose at the same time in the heart of the Supreme Court, since Quesnay de Beaurepaire, President of the Civil Chamber, accused the Criminal Chamber of dreyfusism in the press. He resigned on 8 January 1899 as a hero of the nationalist cause. This crisis led to the divestiture of the Criminal Division in favour of joint chambers. This was the point of blockage for the review.
In 1899 the Affair took up more and more of the political scene. On
16 February 1899, the President of France
Félix Faure died. Émile
Loubet was elected, which was an advance for the cause of the review
as the previous president had been a fierce opponent. On 23 February
1899 at the funeral for
THE APPEAL ON THE JUDGMENT OF 1894
The judges of the criminal division in Le Petit Journal
The Supreme Court considered the affair in the context of press campaigns against the Criminal Division , the magistrates being constantly dragged through the mud in nationalist newspapers from the Panama scandals . On 26 September 1898 after a Cabinet vote the Minister of Justice appealed to the Supreme Court. On 29 October 1898, after the submission of the report from the recorder Alphonse Bard, the Criminal Chamber of the Court stated that "the application is admissible and will proceed with a supplementary investigation."
The recorder Louis Loew presided. He was subjected to a very violent campaign of antisemitic insults due to his being an Alsatian Protestant accused of being a deserter and tainted by the Prussians. Despite the compliant silence of Mercier, Billot, Zurlinden, and Roget who hid behind the authority of "already judged" and "state secret", understanding of the Affair increased. Cavaignac made a statement two days long but failed to prove the guilt of Dreyfus. On the contrary he unwittingly exonerated him by a demonstration of the exact date of the bordereau (August 1894).
Picquart then demonstrated all the workings of the error then the conspiracy. In a decision dated 8 December 1898 in response to his divestiture announcement Picquart was protected from the Military Court by the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court. This was a new obstacle to the wishes of the General Staff. A new furiously antisemitic press campaign burst during the event while L'Aurore on 29 October 1898 published an article entitled Victory in the same character as J'Accuse ...!. The work of the investigation was still to be taken back by the Criminal Division. The "secret file" was analyzed from 30 December 1898 and the Criminal Division requested disclosure of diplomatic records, which was granted.
On 9 February 1899, the Criminal Division submitted its report by highlighting two important facts: it was certain Esterházy used the same paper as the bordereau and the secret file was completely void. These two major events alone destroyed all proceedings against Alfred Dreyfus. In parallel, President Mazeau conducted an inquiry by the Criminal Division, which led to divestiture thereof "to not only leave it to bear alone all responsibility for the final decision" so protecting the Criminal Division from actions arising from its report.
On 28 February 1899, Waldeck-Rousseau spoke to the Senate on the floor and denounced "moral conspiracy" within the government and in the street. The review was no longer avoidable. On 1 March 1899, the new President of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, Alexis Ballot-Beaupré was appointed recorder for the consideration of the application for review. He took on the legal files and decided on a further investigation. Ten additional witnesses were interviewed, which further weakened the version of the General Staff. In the final discussion and by a model of objectivity President Ballot-Beaupré demonstrated the inanity of the bordereau, which was the only charge against Dreyfus. The prosecutor Manau echoed the views of the President. Mr. Mornard who represented Lucie Dreyfus argued without any difficulty or opposition from the prosecution.
On 3 June 1899, the joint chambers of the Supreme Court overturned the judgment of 1894 in solemn audience. The case was referred to the Military Court of Rennes. By that judgment the Supreme Court imposed itself as an absolute authority capable of standing up to military and political power. For many Dreyfusards, this ruling was the prelude to the acquittal of the captain; they forgot to consider that it was again the army who would judge. The Court in overturning the judgement believed in the legal autonomy of the Military Court without taking into account the laws of esprit de corps.
THE TRIAL IN RENNES 1899
CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL
General Mercier, champion of the anti-Dreyfusards, intervened
constantly in the press to confirm the accuracy of the first
judgement: Dreyfus is surely guilty. Immediately however dissent
emerged in the defence of Dreyfus. His two lawyers actually had
opposing strategies. Mr. Demange wanted to stand on the defensive and
just get the acquittal of Dreyfus. Mr. Labori, a brilliant lawyer who
was just 35 years old, wanted an offensive to hit higher, defeating
and publicly humiliating the General Staff.
Mathieu Dreyfus imagined a
complementarity between the two lawyers. The conduct of the trial
showed up the error that served the prosecution with a defence so
impaired. Alfred Dreyfus' trial at the
The trial opened on 7 August 1899 in an atmosphere of extreme
On 14 August 1899 Mr. Labori was the victim of an attack on his way
to court. He was shot in the back by an extremist who escaped and was
never found. The lawyer was missing from discussions for over a week
at the decisive moment of the examination of witnesses. On 22 August
1899 his condition had improved and he returned. Incidents between the
two lawyers for Dreyfus multiplied. Labori reproached Demange about
his excessive caution. The Government in the face of the military
hardening of the trial could still have two ways to influence events:
call for testimony from
On 9 September 1899 the court rendered its verdict: Dreyfus was convicted of treason but "with extenuating circumstances" (by 5 votes against 2) and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and a further degradation. Contrary to appearances this verdict was on the verge of acquittal by one vote. The Code of Military Justice adopted the principle of a minority vote of three against four to be an acquittal.
The day after the verdict Alfred Dreyfus, after much hesitation, filed an appeal for a retrial. Waldeck-Rousseau , in a difficult position, tackled for the first time the possibility of a pardon. Dreyfus had to accept guilt. Exhausted, having been away from his family for too long, he accepted. The decree was signed on 19 September 1899 and he was released on 21 September 1899. Many Dreyfusards were frustrated by this final act. Public opinion welcomed this conclusion indifferently. France wanted civil peace and harmony on the eve of the Universal Exhibition of 1900 and before the big fight that the Republic was about to take for freedom of association and secularism .
It was in this spirit that on 17 November 1899 Waldeck-Rousseau filed
an amnesty law covering "all criminal acts or misdemeanours related to
Colonel Albert Jouaust, Chairman of the Court Martial , reads the verdict of conviction, in one of the weekly Le Monde illustré.
Reactions in France were strong, consisting of "shock and sadness" in the revisionist camp. Still other reactions tended to show that the "verdict of appeasement" made by the judges was understood and accepted by the population. The Republicans sought above all social peace and to turn the page on this extremely long and controversial affair. Also there were very few demonstrations in the provinces while agitation persisted somewhat in Paris. In the military world appeasement was also essential. Two of the seven judges voted for acquittal. They refused to yield to the implied military order. This was also clearly seen. In an apostrophe for the army, Galliffet announced: "The incident is closed".
Anti-French demonstrations took place in twenty foreign capitals and the press was outraged. Reactions were twofold. Norwegian composer Edvard Grieg cancelled his concerts in France in protest. The Anglo-Saxons, as legalists, focused on espionage and challenged rather strongly this conviction devoid of positive arguments in its construction. As such the report of the Lord Chief Justice of England , Lord Russell of Killowen , on 16 September 1899, was a symbol of the global effect of the Affair in Great Britain. The English judge, who went as an observer to Rennes, criticised the weaknesses of the Military Court:
The Military judges were not familiar with the law or criminal proceedings. They lacked the experience and skill that can see the evidence behind the evidence. They were drowning in prejudice and they acted according to what they saw as the honour of the army. Impressed, full of respect for their superiors, they accorded too much importance to fragile allegations that were only made against the accused." Thus he concluded: "For surely it might have been predicted with certainty that, if the revision trial had taken place before the Cour de cassation Dreyfus would now be a free man.
This judicial conclusion also had an unfortunate consequence for the
relationship between the Dreyfus family and the branch of ultra
dreyfusists. Fernand Labori, Jaures, and Clemenceau, with the consent
of Picquart openly accused
Preferring to avoid a third trial the government decided to pardon Dreyfus by a decree signed by President Émile Loubet on 19 September 1899 after much hesitation. Dreyfus was not found innocent. The rehabilitation process was not completed until six years later without sparkle or passion. Many books appeared during this period. In addition to the memoires of Alfred Dreyfus, Reinach published his History of the Dreyfus Affair and Jaurès published The Proofs. As for Zola he wrote the third of his Gospels: Truth. Even Esterházy took advantage of his secrets and sold several different versions of the text of his statement to the consul of France.
DEATH OF ZOLA
On 29 September 1902 Zola who was the initiator of The Affair and the
first of the intellectual Dreyfusards died, asphyxiated by fumes from
his chimney. His wife, Alexandrine, narrowly escaped. It was a shock
for the Dreyfusard clan.
Before recalling the struggle undertaken by Zola for justice and truth is it possible for me to keep silent about those men bent on the destruction of an innocent man and who, after feeling lost, was saved and overwhelmed with the desperate audacity of fear?
How to depart from your sight then I have a duty to show you Zola rises up weak and disarmed against them? Can I hide their lies? It would silence his heroic righteousness. Can I hide their crimes? That would conceal his virtue. Can I silence the insults and calumnies which they have pursued? It would silence his reward and honours. Can I hide their shame? It would silence his glory. No, I will speak. Envy him: he honoured his country and the world by a vast and a great act. Envy him, his destiny and his heart gave out the greatest. It was a moment of human conscience.
Manuel Baudoin , attorney general at the heart of the rehabilitation of Dreyfus
The elections of 1902 saw the victory of the left.
dupes people without honour can no longer rely on the trust of subordinates, without which command is impossible. For my side I can not trust any of my chiefs who have been working on falsehoods , I ask for my retirement.
and the note allegedly annotated (by
Kaiser Wilhelm II ), which
General Mercier had alluded to at the
Given these developments, General
Louis André , the new Minister of
War, led an investigation at the instigation of
Émile Combes and
assisted by judges. The investigation was conducted by Captain Antoine
Louis Targe, aide to the minister. During searches of the Statistics
Section he discovered numerous documents, most of which were obviously
fabricated. In November 1903 a report was submitted to the Minister
of Justice by the Minister of War. This was in compliance with the
regulations since the Minister found an error committed by the
Military Court. This was the beginning of a new review led by lawyer
Ludovic Trarieux , the founder of the League of Human Rights, with a
thorough investigation to run over two years. The years 1904 and 1905
were devoted to different legal phases before the Supreme Court. The
court identified three events (grounds) for review, the demonstration
of the falsification of the Panizzardi telegram, demonstration of a
date change on a document in the 1894 trial (April 1895 changed to
April 1894) and demonstration of the fact that Dreyfus had not removed
the minutes related to heavy artillery in the army. At right,
In regard to the writing of the bordereau the court was particularly
On 9 March 1905 Attorney-General Baudouin delivered an 800-page
report in which he demanded the convictions be quashed without further
reference to another court and denounced the army. He began a
divestiture of the military justice system, which did not conclude
until 1982. It was not until 12 July 1906 that the Supreme Court
unanimously cancelled the judgment without reference to the military
Whereas in the final analysis of the accusation against Dreyfus nothing remains standing and setting aside the judgment of the Military Court leaves nothing that can be considered to be a crime or misdemeanour; therefore by applying the final paragraph of Article 445 no reference to another court should be pronounced.
Dreyfus was reinstated in the army with the rank of artillery major by law on 13 July 1906. This reflected the rank to which he could reasonably have been expected to have risen had his career not been interrupted by the false charges against him. However Dreyfus and his supporters were disappointed that his five years of imprisonment were not taken into account for the reconstruction of his career and that his promotion to major was back-dated only to 10 July 1903. This decision blocked any hope of a career worthy of his past successes before his arrest in 1894. After serving for a year as commander of the artillery depot at Fort Neuf de Vincennes , Major Dreyfus retired in June 1907; a decision taken in part because of recurrent tropical fevers and chronic fatigue arising from the strain of his imprisonment.
On 4 June 1908 on the occasion of the transfer of the ashes of Émile
Zola to the Pantheon
As a reserve officer Dreyfus participated in the
First World War
Dreyfus died on 12 July 1935 at the age of seventy-five years. His
funeral cortège passed through ranks assembled for Bastille Day
celebrations at the
Place de la Concorde
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DREYFUS AFFAIR
For some the
The enduring significance of the Dreyfus Affair... lies in its manifest embodiment of multiple narratives and multiple strands of historical causality. It shows how longstanding beliefs and tensions can be transformed... into a juggernaut that alters the political and cultural landscape for decades. In the interest of increasing our understanding... the complexities of that transformation should be recognized and analyzed rather than packaged for moral or political usefulness.
"Bilan fin de siècle" (Assessment at the end of the century), anti-Republican caricature published in Le Pèlerin in 1900
The Affair brought the confrontation between two sides of France to life. However, according to most historians, this opposition served the republican order. There was indeed a strengthening of parliamentary democracy and a failure of monarchist and reactionary forces.
The excessive violence of the nationalist parties brought together
Republicans in a united front, which defeated attempts to return to
the old order. In the short term, progressive political forces from
the elections of 1893 and confirmed in 1898 as a result of the Dreyfus
affair disappeared in 1899. The shock trials of Esterházy and Zola
created a dreyfusian politics whose aim was to develop a Republican
consciousness and to fight against authoritarian nationalism, which
expressed itself during the Affair. For the uninhibited growth of
populist nationalism was another major result of the event in French
politics even though it did not originate from the Dreyfus affair. It
grew out of the
Boulanger Affair , 1886–1889, and was shaped into a
coherent theory by
Maurice Barrès in 1892.
The other result was an intellectual mutation of socialism. Jaurès
was a late Dreyfusard (January 1898) and was persuaded by
revolutionary socialists. His commitment became unwavering alongside
In addition 1901 saw the birth of the Republican radical socialist Party, the first modern political party, conceived as an electoral machine of the Republican group. It had a permanent structure and relied on networks of Dreyfusards. The creation of the French League for Human Rights was contemporaneous with the affair. It was the hub of the intellectual left and extremely active at the beginning of the century, the conscience of the humanist left.
The final consequence on the political scene at the turn of the century saw a profound renewal of political personalities with the disappearance of great republican figures beginning with Auguste Scheurer-Kestner . Those who at the end of the century could weigh heavily on the events of the affair had now disappeared giving way to new men whose ambition was to reform and correct the errors and injustices of the past.
Family of Félix Vallotton in Le Cri de Paris. The Dreyfus Affair lastingly cut France in two, even within families.
Socially antisemitism was prominent. Existing prior to the Dreyfus
affair it had expressed itself during the boulangisme affair and the
Panama Canal scandal but was limited to an intellectual elite. The
Dreyfus Affair spread hatred of Jews through all strata of society, a
movement that certainly began with the success of Jewish France by
Édouard Drumont in 1886 but was then greatly amplified by various
legal episodes and press campaigns for nearly fifteen years.
Another social consequence was the enhanced role of the press. For
the first time it exerted an important influence on French political
life. It was possible to speak of a fourth estate since it could act
the part of all state organs. Especially as the high editorial
quality of the press was mainly derived from the work of writers and
novelists who used newspapers as a revolutionary way of expression.
The power of the press certainly brought politicians to action, an
example of which was Mercier, who appeared to have pushed at the
Dreyfus trial in 1894 to please
La Libre Parole
The shock of the Dreyfus Affair also affected the Zionist movement "which found fertile ground for its emergence".
The Austro-Hungarian journalist
f France – bastion of emancipation, progress and universal socialism – get caught up in a maelstrom of antisemitism and let the Parisian crowd chant 'Kill the Jews!' Where can they be safe once again – if not in their own country? Assimilation does not solve the problem because the Gentile world will not allow it as the Dreyfus affair has so clearly demonstrated…
The shock was much stronger having lived his youth in Austria , an
antisemitic country, Herzl chose to live in France for the humanist
image that it claimed was a shelter from extremist excess. He had
originally been a fanatic supporter for assimilation of Jews into
European Gentile society. The Dreyfus Affair shook Herzl's view on the
world, and he became completely enveloped in a tiny movement calling
for the restoration of a
He organized on 29 August 1897, the First
Were I to sum up the
On 29 November 1947, a little over fifty years after the First Zionist Congress, the United Nations voted in favor to partition Palestine into a Jewish State. The following year the state of Israel was established. Consequently, the Dreyfus Affair is seen as a turning point in Jewish history and as the beginning of the Zionist Movement in modern times.
OTHER RELATED EVENTS
COMMISSION OF SCULPTURE
In 1985, President
On 12 July 2006 President
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE DREYFUS AFFAIR
The Dreyfus Affair is distinguished by the large number of books published on this subject. A substantial portion of these publications are mere polemical and not historical books. These works can however be consulted in the context of a study of psycho-social aspects of the Affair.
The great interest in the study of the
The contemporary literature of the case was published between 1894 and 1906. Beginning with the pamphlet of Bernard Lazare, the first intellectual Dreyfusard: despite factual errors, it remains a testament of the different stages of the review.
The work of Joseph Reinach , The History of the Dreyfus Affair in seven volumes, which first appeared in 1901 and ended with the index in 1911, was the reference for the publication of the scientific historical work delivered from 1960. It contains a wealth of accurate information despite some interpretations generally challenged on the why of the Affair.
On the other hand, there are "instant memoires" of direct witnesses
like the antisemitic and dishonest book of Esterházy, or those of
The precis of the Dreyfus Affair by "Henri-Dutrait Crozon", a pseudonym of Colonel Larpent, is the basis of all anti-Dreyfusard literature after the Affair to the present time. The author develops the theory of conspiracy, fueled by Jewish finance, to push Esterházy to accuse himself of crime. Under a scientific exterior there will be found there an elaboration of theories without evidence or support.
The publication of notes by Schwartzkoppen in 1930 shed light on the guilty role of Esterházy in the Affair and exonerated Alfred Dreyfus at the same time, if it was needed. The extreme right questioned the value of this testimony but most historians hold it to be a valid source despite some ambiguities and inaccuracies.
The period of the Occupation throws a veil over the case. The
Liberation and the revelation of the Holocaust brought a deep
reflection on all of the Dreyfus Affair. Jacques Kayser (1946) then
Maurice Paléologue (1955) and Henri Giscard d\'Estaing (1960) revived
the case without great revelations, a process generally considered
insufficient historically. First brochure of A Miscarriage of
Bernard Lazare published in 1896 in
Marcel Thomas, chief curator at the National Archives, in 1961 provided through his The Affair without Dreyfus in two volumes a complete review of the history of the Affair supported by all available public and private archives. His work is the foundation of all subsequent historical studies.
Henri Guillemin in the same year with his Enigma Esterházy seemed to find the key to the "riddle" in the existence of a third man (other than Dreyfus and Esterházy), an explanation that was shared momentarily with Michel Lombarès then abandoned a few years later.
Jean Doise, of the Ecole Normale Superieure and a military professional with a strong technical background attempts to explain the genesis of the case through the development, between 1892 and 1897, of the famous French 75mm field gun. Doise proposes in A Secret well guarded. Military History of the Dreyfus Affair that Alfred Dreyfus had been used by French counterintelligence to distract German espionage from the French 75's secret development and furthermore that Major Esterházy, who once served in military counterintelligence, had played a role in this manipulation. These hypotheses, however, are regarded with skepticism.
In 1983, the lawyer and historian Jean-Denis Bredin published L'Affair (The Affair); it is recognized as the best summary of the Dreyfus Affair. The interest of the book focuses on a strictly factual relating of the story with documented facts and multifaceted reflection on the different aspects of the event. The book also revealed for the first time the existence of homosexual correspondence in the prosecution case.
Reflecting the intense interest in social history that gripped
historians since the 1960s and 1970s, Eric Cahm wrote The Dreyfus
Affair in French Society and Politics (1996), an excellent analysis of
the sociology of the Affair. Michael Burns, Rural Society and French
Politics, Boulangism and the Dreyfus Affair, 1886–1900 (1984) does
the same in a more limited fashion. Vincent Duclert's Biography of
Expanding on a 2008 article they published in la Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, in 2012 the historians Pierre Gervais, Pauline Peretz and Pierre Stutin published Le dossier secret de l'affaire Dreyfus (The Secret Record of the Dreyfus Affair). Their research enabled the original contents of the secret file to be established. Their thesis was that historians had neglected the correspondence of Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi, and that homosexuality played a central role in the slandering of Dreyfus.
In addition the Dreyfus Affair provided the basis for many novels.
The last work of
Many artifacts and documents related to the affair are on display in the Musée d\'Art et d\'Histoire du Judaïsme in Paris.
* Beilis affair * Hilsner Affair * Leo Frank affair * Human Rights League (France) * The Dreyfus Affair (film series) , an 1899 series of short silent docudramas * Musée d\'Art et d\'Histoire du Judaïsme
* ^ Dreyfus was from
Book or article used as a source for writing this article
* 1898 (in French) Verbatim record of the trial of Emile Zola in the
Assizes of the Seine and the Supreme Court.
* 1898 (in French) Enquiry of the Supreme Court (1898–1899).
* 1898 (in French) Proceedings of the Supreme Court for the revision
of the Dreyfus trial.
* 1899 (in French) Verbatim record of the proceedings of Rennes
Volume 1, Volume 2, Volume 3
* 1904 (in French) Memoire of
* 1901 (in French) Joseph Reinach , History of the Dreyfus Affair, Fasquelle, 1901–1911; éd. Robert Laffont, two vol., 2006 231. * 1961 (in French) Marcel Thomas, The Affair without Dreyfus, Fayard – Idégraf (Geneva), 1961–1979 – 2 volumes. * 1981 (in French) Jean-Denis Bredin , The Affair, Fayard, Paris, 1993 (1ère édition 1981) (ISBN 2-260-00346-X ). * 1986 (in English) Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair: the Case of Alfred Dreyfus, George Braziller, New York, ISBN 0-8076-1175-1 Plunkett Lake Press Ebooks * 2005 (in French) Vincent Duclert, Biography of Alfred Dreyfus, The honour of a patriot, Fayard, Paris, 2006 (ISBN 2213627959 ).
OTHER GENERAL WORKS
* McMillan, James F. Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society in France 1898–1991 (1992) pp. 3–12 * Sowerwine, Charles. France since 1870: Culture, Society and the Making of the Republic (2001) excerpt and text search pp. 67–72 * 1984 (in English) Michael Burns, Rural Society and French Politics, Boulangism and the Dreyfus Affair, 1886–1900 Princeton University Press. * 1991 (in English) Alfred S. Lindemann, The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs, Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank, 1894–1914 (Cambridge University Press). * 1992 (in English) Michael Burns, Dreyfus: A Family Affair, from the French Revolution to the Holocaust, New York: Harper. * 1998 (in English) Michael Burns, France and the Dreyfus Affair: A Documentary History (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's) * 1996 (in English) Eric Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics New York: Longman * 2006 (in English) George R. Whyte , The Accused – The Dreyfus Trilogy, Inter Nationes, ISBN 3-929979-28-4 * 2006 (in English) George R. Whyte, The Dreyfus Affair – A chronological history, Palgrave Macmillan 2006, ISBN 978-0-230-20285-6
* 2007 (in English) Ruth Harris, The Assumptionists and the Dreyfus Affair, Past & Present (2007) 194#1 175–211. in Project MUSE * 2010 (in English) Ruth Harris, Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century (Henry Holt and Company) * 2008 (in French) Philippe Oriol, History of the Dreyfus Affair – Vol 1 – The History of Captain Dreyfus, Stock, (ISBN 978-2-234-06080-7 ) * 2009 (in English) Louis Begley , Why the Dreyfus Affair Matters (Yale University Press) * 2010 (in English) Frederick Brown, For the Soul of France: Culture Wars in the Age of Dreyfus (Alfred A. Knopf) * 2012 (in English) Robert L. Fuller, The Origins of the French Nationalist Movement, 1886–1914, Jefferson, NC: McFarland. * 2012 (in English) Piers Paul Read , The Dreyfus Affair, Bloomsbury, London
* 1961 (in French) Pierre Miquel, The Dreyfus Affair, University of France Press – PUF – coll. "What do I know?", réprinted 2003 (ISBN 2130532268 ) * 1989 (in French) Pierre Miquel, The Third Republic, Fayard * 1986 (in French) Michel Winock , The fever of France. The great political crises. 1871–1968, Points Seuil, (ISBN 2020098318 ) * 1999 (in French) Michel Winock, The School of Intellectuals, Le Seuil, coll. Points * 1994 (in French) Pierre Birnbaum , The Dreyfus Affair, The Republic in peril, Gallimard, coll. "Discoveries", (ISBN 978-2070532773 ). * 1994 (in French) Pierre Birnbaum, The France of the Dreyfus Affair, Gallimard, Paris * 1998 (in French) Pierre Birnbaum, Was the French Army Antisemitic?, pp. 70–82 in Michel Winock: The Dreyfus Affair, Editions du Seuil, Paris, ISBN 2-02-032848-8 * 1994 (in French) Michael Burns , Histoire d'une famille française, les Dreyfus, Fayard, 1994 (ISBN 978-2213031323 ) * 1994 (in French) Éric Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair, Päperback, coll. "references" * 1994 (in French) Michel Drouin (dir.), The Dreyfus Affair Dictionary, Flammarion, reprinted 2006 (ISBN 2082105474 ). * 1994 (in French) Vincent Duclert, The Dreyfus Affair, The Discovery, reprinted 2006 (ISBN 2707147931 ). * 2006 (in French) Vincent Duclert, Dreyfus is Innocent: History of an Affair of State, Larousse, (ISBN 203582639X ) * 2006 (in French) Vincent Duclert, Alfred Dreyfus, Librairie Artheme Fayard, ISBN 2-213-62795-9 * 2010 (in French) Vincent Duclert, The Dreyfus Affair. When justice enlightens the Republic, Private * 1999 (in English) Martin P. Johnson, The Dreyfus Affair: Honour and Politics in the Belle Epoque (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). * 2000 (in French) Francis Démier, The France of the Nineteenth Century, Seuil, coll. "Points in History". * 2006 (in French) Méhana Mouhou, Dreyfus Affair: conspiracy in the Republic, Éd. L'Harmattan. * 2012 (in French) Pierre Gervais, Pauline Peretz et Pierre Stutin, The secret file of the Dreyfus Affair, Alma editor, (ISBN 978-2362790430 )
* 1960 (in French) Patrice Boussel, The Dreyfus Affair and the Press, Armand Colin, coll. "Kiosk", 272 pp. * 1962 (in French) Henri Guillemin, The Esterházy Enigma, Gallimard * 1994 (in French) Jean Doise, A Secret well guarded – Military History of the Dreyfus Affair, Le Seuil, 225 pp. (ISBN 2-02-021100-9 ) * 1998 (in French) Philippe-E. Landau, Jewish Opinion and the Dreyfus Affair, Albin Michel, "The Presence of Judaism", paperback * 2000 (in French) Armand Israël, The hidden truth of the Dreyfus Affair, Albin Michel, (ISBN 2-226-11123-9 ) * 2000 (in French) Collective, Intellectuals face the Dreyfus Affair, then and now, L'Harmattan, (ISBN 978-2738460257 ) * 2004 (in French) Général André Bach, The Army of Dreyfus. A political history of the French army from Charles X to "The Affair", Tallandier, (ISBN 2-84734-039-4 ) * 2006 (in French) Thierry Lévy, Jean-Pierre Royer, Labori, a lawyer, Louis Audibert Éditions, (ISBN 2-226-11123-9 ) * 2006 (in French) Supreme Court, collective, Justice in the Dreyfus Affair, Fayard, (ISBN 978-2213629520 ) * 2006 (in French) Pierre Touzin et Francois Vauvillier, Guns of Victory 1914–1918, Volume 1, The Artillery of the campaign. History and Collections, Paris. ISBN 2-35250-022-2 * 2010 (in French) Georges Joumas, Echos of the Dreyfus Affair for an Orléanais, Corsaire Éditions, (ISBN 978-2-910475-12-3 ) * 2013 (in English) Leila Schneps and Coralie Colmez, Math on trial. How numbers get used and abused in the courtroom, Basic Books, 2013. ISBN 978-0-465-03292-1 . (Chapter 10: "Math error number 10: mathematical madness. The Dreyfus affair: spy or scapegoat?").
* 1909 (in French) Henri Dutrait-Crozon, Précis of the Dreyfus Affair, Paris, New National Library, First Editionmière, Final Edition 1924.
ARTICLES AND NEWSPAPERS
* 1978 (in French) Dreyfusards!: Memories from
Mathieu Dreyfus and
other novelties (presented by Robert Gauthier). Gallimard & Julliard,
coll. Archives No. 16, Paris
* 1988 (in French) Max Guermann, "The terrible truth", Revue Les
Cahiers Naturalistes, No. 62.
* 1994 (in French) Revue in L'Histoire n o 173, Spécial Dreyfus,
* 2005 (in French)
* 1898 (in French)
News And Stories
* 1899 (in French) Dereliction of Duty in the Trial at
* 1965 (in French) The Dreyfus Affair, French film by Jean Vigne, made for schools – Black and White – 18 min * 1972 (in English) The Dreyfus Affair, American Documentary Film – Black and White – 15 min * 1974 (in French) Dreyfus or the Intolerable Truth, French Documentary Film by Jean Chérasse – Colour – 90 min – DVD 2006 by Alpamedia/Janus Diffusion * 1994 (in French) Reasons of State: Chronicle of the Dreyfus Affair, French film in two episodes by Pierre Sorlin – Colour – 26 min
* 1899 (in English) Trial of Captain Dreyfus, American film –
Black and White
* 1919 (in French) J\'accuse , French silent film by
* 1964 (in English) In the first season episode "Rock-a-Bye Munster", of the TV show The Munsters, Herman and Lilly mention meeting 'that charming Captain Dreyfus' on their honeymoon at Devil's Island. * 1966 (in English) The Time Tunnel, episode "Devil's Island". Story in which Drs. Newman Theater Basle, 16 October 1994; The Dreyfus Affair New York City Opera, April 1996); the dance drama Dreyfus- J'accuse (Oper der Stadt Bonn, 4 September 1994) and the musical satire Rage et Outrage (Arte, April 1994; Zorn und Schande, Arte 1994; Rage and Outrage Channel 4, May 1994). * 1998 (in English) Dreyfus: Prisoner of Devil's Island – Music Theatre piece – Music and Lyrics by Bryan Kesselman, St Giles Cripplegate, London, November 1998; Part of the 9th London international Jewish Music Festival. * 2008 Dreyfus In time by George Whyte, Opernhaus Zurich, December 2008; Jüdisches Museum Berlin, May 2009. Also in German, English, French, Hungarian, Hebrew and Czech.
* 1995 (in French) The Dreyfus Affair, interview with George Whyte, France Culture, 25 March 1995. * 1998 (in French) J'accuse, George Whyte, Canadian Broadcasting Service (CBS), 10 October 1998. * 2005 (in English) The Dreyfus Affair, interview with George Whyte, BBC Radio 3. By John Pilgrim, 28 October 2005. * 2009 (in English) BBC Radio, J'Accuse, UK, Hattie Naylor. Radio dramatisation inspired by a newspaper article written by Émile Zola in response to the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s. BBC Radio 4, broadcast on 13 June 2009. * 2009 (in English) "In Our Time, The Dreyfus Affair" Downloadable discussion on BBC Radio 4. Melvyn Bragg; Robert Gildea, Professor of Modern History at Oxford University; Ruth Harris, Lecturer in Modern History at Oxford University; Robert Tombs, Professor of French History at Cambridge University. * 2010 (in English) Interview with Ruth Harris about her book Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, And the Scandal of the Century (2010).
* ^ Guy Canivet, first President of the Supreme Court , Justice
from the Dreyfus Affair, p. 15.
* ^ "Judgment of the Supreme Court on 12 July 1906" (PDF).
* ^ Michel Winock, "The Dreyfus Affair as a founding myth," in La
France politique, Éditions du Seuil, coll. Points History, 2003, pp.
151–165. (in French)
* ^ For these three paragraphs, cf. Jean-Marie Mayeur, The
Beginnings of the Third Republic, Éditions du Seuil, 1973, pp.
209–217. (in French)
* ^ Duclert, The Dreyfus Affair, p. 5. (in French)
* ^ On the appearance of the 75 mm gun see: Doise, A Secret well
guarded, p. 9. (in French)
* ^ "Gay love sheds light on l\'affaire Dreyfus The Times".
* ^ "Trial of the Century". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2016-08-17.
* ^ Weber, Caroline (2013-03-13). "Dreyfus, Proust and the Crimes
of the Belle Epoque". Bloomberg View. Retrieved 2016-08-17.
* ^ A B Idier, Antoine (2012-10-23). "Pierre Gervais, Pauline
Peretz, Pierre Stutin, Le dossier secret de l\'affaire Dreyfus".
Lectures (in French). ISSN 2116-5289 .
* ^ A B "L\'affaire Dreyfus est aussi une affaire d\'homophobie"
(in French). Retrieved 2016-08-30.
* ^ Bach, The Army of Dreyfus, p. 534. (in French)
* ^ Reid, Piers Paul. The Dreyfus Affair. p. 83. ISBN
* ^ The Jews in the army
* ^ Frederick Viey Anti-Semitism in the Army: the Coblentz Affair
at Fontainebleau. (in French)
* ^ Miquel, The Third Republic, p. 391. (in French)
* ^ Duclert, The Dreyfus Affair, p. 8. (in French)
* ^ Marcel Thomas, The Affair without Dreyfus (in French)
* ^ See especially Reinach, History of the Dreyfus Affair, Volume
1, pp. 40–42. (in French)
* ^ "usual way" jargon of the SR meaning: documents retrieved by
the housekeeper of the German Embassy: Thomas, The Affair without
Dreyfus, p. 140 et seq. (in French)
* ^ Not small pieces. In addition the paper was not wrinkled.
Bredin, The Affair, p. 67. (in French)
* ^ The only important information in the document was a note on
the 120 C Baquet gun, an artillery piece that represented only 1.4% of
modern French artillery in 1914 and 0.6% of all artillery. Doise, A
well kept secret, p. 55 et seq. (in French)
* ^ On the Statistics Section, see Bredin, pp. 49–50; Doise, pp.
42–43 and Thomas, The Affair without Dreyfus, pp. 60–70. (in
* ^ Thomas, The Affair without Dreyfus, p. 67. (in French) Alfred
Dreyfus was also from Mulhouse.
* ^ "This wimp Mercier" said Rochefort in Intransigeant, Boussel,
The Dreyfus Affair and the Press, pp. 43–44. (in French)
* ^ Bredin, The Affair, p. 65. (in French)
* ^ Reinach, History of the Dreyfus Affair, Volume 1, p. 39. (in
* ^ A B Birnbaum, The Dreyfus Affair, p. 40. (in French)
* ^ Birnbaum, The Dreyfus Affair, p. 48. (in French)
* ^ Burns, a family...., p. 139. (in French)
* ^ Thomas, The Affair without Dreyfus, p. 260. (in French)
* ^ Sandherr was a fanatical antisemite.
Maurice Paléologue , The
Dreyfus Affair and the Quai d'Orsay (in French)
* ^ It has been argued in many books that Dreyfus was unemotional
and indifferent to his fate: that was ultimately refuted by many
testimonies. V. Duclert, Biography of Alfred Dreyfus, p. 115 et seq.
* ^ Birnbaum, The Dreyfus Affair, p. 38. (in French)
* ^ General Mercier to his subordinates: Bredin, The Affair, p. 69.
(in French) Also reported elsewhere.
* ^ On the personalities of Mercier and du Paty de Clam, see:
Palaeologue, The Dreyfus Affair and the Quai d'Orsay, pp. 111 et seq.
* ^ Guillemin, The enigma Esterházy, Volume 1, p. 99. (in French)
* ^ Bredin, The Affair, p. 0. (in French)
* ^ The General met with the President of the Republic,
Casimir-Perier , to minimize the importance of the documents
submitted, this Mercier later denied, which made the two men
implacable enemies. See The Trial at
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* (in English) (in French) Text of J\'accuse! * 1906 : Dreyfus site of the French Ministry of Culture * (in French) Dreyfus Site of the National Assembly * Jewish Library: Alfred